Mutual Information as Privacy-Loss Measure in Strategic Communication

Farhad Farokhi,G. Nair

Published 2015 in arXiv.org

ABSTRACT

A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message that balances a trade-off between providing an accurate measurement and minimizing the amount of leaked private information, which is assumed to be correlated with the to-be-estimated variable. The mutual information between the transmitted message and the private information is used as a measure of the amount of leaked information. An equilibrium is constructed and its properties are investigated.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2015

  • Venue

    arXiv.org

  • Publication date

    2015-09-18

  • Fields of study

    Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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