A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message that balances a trade-off between providing an accurate measurement and minimizing the amount of leaked private information, which is assumed to be correlated with the to-be-estimated variable. The mutual information between the transmitted message and the private information is used as a measure of the amount of leaked information. An equilibrium is constructed and its properties are investigated.
Mutual Information as Privacy-Loss Measure in Strategic Communication
Published 2015 in arXiv.org
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- Publication year
2015
- Venue
arXiv.org
- Publication date
2015-09-18
- Fields of study
Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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