Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2015

• Venue

  Research Papers in Economics

• Publication date

  2015-01-25

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Economics

• Identifiers

  No identifiers available.

• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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