Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

C. Cox,Brock V. Stoddard

Published 2015 in Games

ABSTRACT

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2015

  • Venue

    Games

  • Publication date

    2015-09-25

  • Fields of study

    Sociology, Computer Science, Economics

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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