We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.
Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers
Published 2015 in Games
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- Publication year
2015
- Venue
Games
- Publication date
2015-09-25
- Fields of study
Sociology, Computer Science, Economics
- Identifiers
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Semantic Scholar
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