Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2011

• Venue

  Artificial Intelligence

• Publication date

  2011-02-01

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.artint.2010.10.007
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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