Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2016

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  Unknown publication date

• Fields of study

  Law, Philosophy, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/B978-0-12-802460-7.00002-4
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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