Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2004

• Venue

  Environmental and Resource Economics

• Publication date

  2004-04-01

• Fields of study

  Political Science, Economics, Environmental Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1023/B:EARE.0000018520.19216.2A
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Special Interest Politics

  2001cited by this paper
• Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (Zeuthen Lectures)

  2000cited by this paper
• Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation

  1999cited by this paper
• Optimal Public Harvesting Under the Interdependence of Public and Private Forests

  1999cited by this paper
• The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing

  1999cited by this paper
• World Forests, Society and Environment

  1999cited by this paper
• Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination

  1999cited by this paper
• Environmental quality with endogenous domestic and trade policies1

  1999cited by this paper
• A game-theoretic model of timber prices with capital stock: an empirical application to the Finnish pulp and paper industry

  1998cited by this paper
• Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy

  1998cited by this paper
• The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy

  1997cited by this paper
• Measuring oligopsony power

  1995cited by this paper
• A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

  1993cited by this paper
• Protection for Sale

  1992cited by this paper
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence

  1986cited by this paper
• The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly

  1980cited by this paper
• Toward a More General Theory of Regulation

  1976cited by this paper
• Book Review: Organizational Behavior: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups

  1966cited by this paper

• Governing multiple-use forests as commons and the capability approach. The case of forestry and the Sami reindeer herders in Sweden

  2026cites this paper
• On the free allocation of emission rights under endogenous lobby formation

  2026cites this paper
• Food self-sufficiency and GM regulation under conflicting interests: the case of GM maize in South Africa

  2020cites this paper
• Regulating whale watching: A common agency analysis

  2019cites this paper
• The Conservation Effects of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Biased Policymakers

  2018cites this paper
• Regulation as a political contest: the probability of conservation of a renewable resource

  2018cites this paper
• Regulation as a policy contest: the probability of conservation of a renewable resource

  2017cites this paper
• Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence

  2015cites this paper
• The colonial origins of deforestation: an institutional analysis

  2015cites this paper
• Assessing the impact of institutional conditions upon REDD

  2014cites this paper
• STATIC COMMON AGENCY AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: AN EVALUATIVE SURVEY

  2014cites this paper
• Modelling political influence on the choice of policies for REDD+

  2012cites this paper
• Does Pervasive Corruption Matter For Firm's Demand for Good Governance in Developing Countries?

  2011cites this paper
• How concessions’ size may influence systemic corruption in forest harvesting: A theoretical assessment

  2011cites this paper
• Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation

  2010cites this paper
• Ecological‐Economic Modeling for Biodiversity Management: Potential, Pitfalls, and Prospects

  2006cites this paper
• Corruption and Energy Efficiency in OECD Countries: Theory and Evidence

  2004cites this paper
• Political economy of land use and logging in presence of externalities

  2003cites this paper