Agency Design and Postlegislative Influence over the Bureaucracy

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2007

• Venue

  Political Research Quarterly

• Publication date

  2007-12-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1177/1065912907304151
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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