On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2019

• Venue

  Public Choice

• Publication date

  2019-10-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science, History

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/S11127-018-0542-4
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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