This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.
CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK?
Jie Chen,M. Goergen,Woon Sau Leung,Weiling Song
Published 2019 in Journal of Banking & Finance
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publication date
2019-06-01
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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