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Complexity Results for Manipulation, Bribery and Control of the Kemeny Procedure in Judgment Aggregation

Ronald de Haan

Published 2016 in arXiv.org

ABSTRACT

We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular, we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better group outcome by reporting an insincere individual opinion, (2) bribery, where an external agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by bribing a number of individuals, and (3) control (by adding or deleting issues), where an external agent aims to achieve an outcome with certain properties by influencing the set of issues in the judgment aggregation situation. We show that determining whether these types of strategic behavior are possible (and if so, computing a policy for successful strategic behavior) is complete for the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy. That is, we show that these problems are $\Sigma^p_2$-complete.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2016

  • Venue

    arXiv.org

  • Publication date

    2016-08-08

  • Fields of study

    Computer Science, Economics

  • Identifiers
    arXiv 1608.02406
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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