Interaction and self-correction

In this paper, I address the question of how to account for the normative dimension involved in conceptual competence in a naturalistic framework. First, I present what I call the naturalist challenge (NC), referring to both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions of conceptual possession and acquisition. I then criticize two models that have been dominant in thinking about conceptual competence, the interpretationist and the causalist models. Both fail to meet NC, by failing to account for the abilities involved in conceptual self-correction. I then offer an alternative account of self-correction that I develop with the help of the interactionist theory of mutual understanding arising from recent developments in phenomenology and developmental psychology.

• Publication year

  2014

• Venue

  Frontiers in Psychology

• Publication date

  2014-07-23

• Fields of study

  Medicine, Philosophy, Psychology

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00798PMID 25101044PMCID 4107969
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar, PubMed

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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