Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2003

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  2003-06-03

• Fields of study

  Law, Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1920/WP.IFS.2003.0311
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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