Abstract Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become an important tool to build infrastructure and deliver public services. In China, infrastructure partners include both state-owned enterprises and private companies. We theorize that partners with different ownership types will have different preferences of revenue regimes for infrastructure projects and that regional corruption will moderate this relationship. We use data from the China PPP Center and official statistics to test these hypotheses, and the findings largely confirm our expectations. In comparison to private firms, SOEs and hybrids are more likely to pursue a government-payment mechanism, but the moderating effect of regional corruption is not supported.
Ownership, corruption, and revenue regimes for infrastructure partnerships: Evidence from China
Published 2019 in Utilities Policy
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
Utilities Policy
- Publication date
2019-10-01
- Fields of study
Business, Economics, Political Science
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