Abstract Mental representations of possibility in everyday contexts incorporate descriptive and prescriptive norms. People intuitively think that Mr. X cannot perform an immoral action; even when upon deliberation they realize that the immoral action is in fact possible ( Phillips & Cushman, 2017 ). We replicate this “moral-possibility constraint”, providing further support for the notion that default representations of possibility are - at first pass - limited to moral alternatives. We also test how context affects representations of possibility by asking whether the same findings hold in a war context. This context has different prescriptive norms (e.g., it is permissible to kill combatants, but not non-combatants), and we use Phillips and Cushman's (2017) reaction-time paradigm to test whether these prescriptive norms shape people's representations of what is possible in war. We find that the moral-possibility constraint is sensitive to variation in degree of immorality (e.g., killing a person vs. torturing a child); however the war context did not influence the constraint in the way we expected. The results further advance our understanding of the relationship between morality and domain-general cognition, and provide insight into the moral landscape of war.
The moral landscape of war: A registered report testing how the war context shapes morality's constraints on default representations of possibility
Published 2019 in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
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- Publication year
2019
- Venue
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
- Publication date
2019-11-01
- Fields of study
Political Science, Psychology
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