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Content, Mental Representation and Intentionality: Challenging the Revolutionary Character of Radical Enactivism

Pierre Steiner

Published 2019 in Croatian Journal of Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Criticisms and rejections of representationalism are increasingly popular in 4E cognitive science, and especially in radical enactivism. But by overfocusing our attention on the debate between radical enactivism and classical representationalism, we might miss the woods for the trees, in at least two respects: fi rst, by neglecting the relevance of other theoretical alternatives about representationalism in cognitive science; and second by not seeing how much REC and classical representationalism are in agreement concerning basic and problematic issues dealing with mental content and intentionality. In order to expand and exemplify these ideas, this paper presents two heterodox positions on intentionality and on the relations between content and representation. Special attention is paid to the way REC is rejecting these positions: I argue that this rejection reveals common assumptions with classical representationalism, but also undermines the coherence of REC’s conception of intentionality.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2019

  • Venue

    Croatian Journal of Philosophy

  • Publication date

    Unknown publication date

  • Fields of study

    Philosophy

  • Identifiers

    No identifiers available.

  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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