Identity and equal treatment in negative externality agreements

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2019

• Venue

  International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

• Publication date

  2019-11-02

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/s10784-019-09456-5
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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