A Theoretical Model of Lobbying

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2020

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  Unknown publication date

• Fields of study

  Economics, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-36044-3_5
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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