More than a dozen Federal policy changes since the year 2000 have affected incentives to prescribe, manufacture, and purchase both prescription and illicitly-manufactured opioids. To the extent that one of the policies, the 2013 OHolder memo,O had a meaningful effect on the cost structure of suppliers of heroin and illicit fentanyl, standard consumer theory predicts that the trend for opioid-involved fatalities would proceed in distinct phases. Prior to 2013, subsidies to, and conveniences for, prescribers and consumers would increase total opioid consumption by reducing the full price of Rx. More surprising is that, with heroin relatively cheap of late, any Rx opioid policy could Ð and likely does Ð have the opposite total-consumption effect after 2013 than it would before, especially when the more expensive Rx opioid products are most affected. Subsidies to benzodiazepines (an opioid complement) increase opioid consumption in both phases. While policy changes at first reduced the full price of Rx, and then later increased it, technological change in illicit markets is also a relevant factor over the longer term.
Prices and Federal Policies in Opioid Markets
Casey B. Mulligan,Casey B. Mulligan
Published 2020 in Social Science Research Network
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2020
- Venue
Social Science Research Network
- Publication date
2020-02-01
- Fields of study
Medicine, Business, Economics
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-74 of 74 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
Showing 1-16 of 16 citing papers · Page 1 of 1