AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REFERRALS

Youze Lang,Youzhi Yang

Published 2023 in International Economic Review

ABSTRACT

About 40% of workers find their jobs through referrals. We distinguish between two types of referrals based on whether the referrer works at the hiring firm (internal referrals) or not (external referrals). Interestingly, jobs found through internal (external) referrals pay more (less) than those found through formal methods. An equilibrium labor market model is then built by introducing an incentive‐compatible mechanism through which workers can share job opening information. A non‐degenerate wage distribution arises in equilibrium with a wage premium (penalty) for internal (external) referrals. When calibrated, our model can capture these salient features of the U.S. labor market.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved

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