Collaborative spectrum sensing is vulnerable to data falsification attacks, where malicious secondary users (attackers) submit manipulated sensing reports to mislead the fusion center's decision on spectrum occupancy. This paper considers a challenging attack scenario, where multiple attackers cooperatively maximize their aggregate spectrum utilization. Without attack-prevention mechanisms, we show that honest secondary users (SUs) are unable to opportunistically transmit over the licensed spectrum and may even get penalized for collisions caused by attackers. To prevent such attacks, we propose two attack-prevention mechanisms with direct and indirect punishments. Our key idea is to identify collisions with the primary user (PU) that should not happen if all SUs follow the fusion center's decision. Unlike prior work, the proposed simple mechanisms do not require the fusion center to identify and exclude attackers. The direct punishment can effectively prevent all attackers from behaving maliciously. The indirect punishment is easier to implement and can prevent attacks when the attackers care enough about their long-term reward.
Attack Prevention for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks
Lingjie Duan,Alexander W. Min,Jianwei Huang,K. Shin
Published 2011 in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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- Publication year
2011
- Venue
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Publication date
2011-09-05
- Fields of study
Computer Science, Engineering
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