Will quadratic voting produce optimal public policy?

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2020

• Venue

  Public Choice

• Publication date

  2020-11-11

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/s11127-019-00767-4
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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