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Sovereign Spreads and the Political Leaning of Nations

Ionut Cotoc,Alok Johri,César Sosa‐Padilla

Published 2021 in Social Science Research Network

ABSTRACT

Nations with a higher propensity to elect left governments tend to pay higher and more volatile sovereign spreads. We build a sovereign default model with elections between left and right policymakers. Reelection probabilities increase with government spending, with the left having a small advantage (consistent with the data). We use variation in “election efficiency” to create model economies that elect the left more (left leaning) or less frequently (right leaning) in equilibrium. The left‐leaning economy has a higher reluctance for fiscal austerity than the right‐leaning economy, chooses higher government spending, and faces higher spreads, resulting in lower welfare.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    2021

  • Venue

    Social Science Research Network

  • Publication date

    2021-08-01

  • Fields of study

    Economics, Political Science

  • Identifiers
    DOI 10.3386/w29197
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

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