Reciprocity and Social Norms: Short- and Long-Run Crowding Out Effects of Financial Incentives

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.

• Publication year

  2021

• Venue

  Frontiers of Economics in China

• Publication date

  2021-12-15

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.54605/fec20210202
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• No references are available for this paper.

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