We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference of individual decision makers and the consensual choice of a group, that have been empirically observed in choice dilemmas. In particular, a deviation from the Nash equilibrium toward the risky strategy occurs when the dynamics takes place on heterogeneous hypergraphs. These results can explain the emergence of irrational herding and radical behaviors in social groups.
Evolutionary Game Model of Group Choice Dilemmas on Hypergraphs.
Andrea Civilini,Nejat Anbarcı,V. Latora
Published 2021 in Physical Review Letters
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- Publication year
2021
- Venue
Physical Review Letters
- Publication date
2021-04-22
- Fields of study
Biology, Medicine, Physics, Computer Science
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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