: We study the causal effect of unsought political connections on firm value. To address concerns of potential endogeneity and sample-selection bias we exploit the nationalization of Argentina’s pension system, a unique natural experiment yielding exogenous variation in new political connections. We find unsought political connections to have a large negative effect on the value of newly connected firms. Yet this result only materializes when, in addition to becoming a shareholder, the government also obtains the right to appoint directors. Decreased stock liquidity or higher stock volatility do not explain this result, suggesting a channel that decreases expected cash flows to shareholders.
Sleeping with the enemy: The perils of having the government on(the)board
Santiago Barraza,Martín A. Rossi,Christian A. Ruzzier
Published 2022 in Journal of comparative economics (Print)
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2022
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Journal of comparative economics (Print)
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2022-01-01
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