The Welfare Implications of the European Trucks Cartel

This paper presents a pragmatic approach to calculating the total economic loss induced by a cartel, focusing on the European trucks cartel (1997–2011). This comprehensible and transparent approach builds on the theory of monopoly pricing and uses the publicly available data of the infringing companies. Overall, a net welfare loss of up to 15.5 billion euro and an overcharge to the amount of up to 7.6% are estimated. This loss to society cannot be offset by fines or private damage claims and should raise awareness for antitrust policy. The findings presented are relevant for both practitioners and policymakers.

• Publication year

  2020

• Venue

  Intereconomics. Review of European Economic Policy

• Publication date

  2020-03-01

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1007/s10272-020-0881-5
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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