Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2023

• Venue

  Journal of Management Science and Engineering

• Publication date

  2023-03-01

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.jmse.2022.12.004
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints

  2021cited by this paper
• The timing of discretionary bonuses - effort, signals, and reciprocity

  2020cited by this paper
• A Bayesian approach to continuous type principal-agent problems

  2020cited by this paper
• Innovation, short‐termism, and the cost of strong corporate governance

  2020cited by this paper
• Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence

  2020cited by this paper
• Performance-Induced CEO Turnover

  2020cited by this paper
• Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: Computing incentives under risk

  2019cited by this paper
• CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short‐Termism

  2019cited by this paper
• Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting*

  2019cited by this paper
• Managerial Short-Termism, Turnover Policy, and the Dynamics of Incentives

  2018cited by this paper
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system

  2018cited by this paper
• Optimal Long-term Contracting with Learning

  2017cited by this paper
• Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts

  2016cited by this paper
• Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing

  2014cited by this paper
• Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited

  2013cited by this paper
• Dynamics of Contract Design with Screening

  2013cited by this paper
• Earnings quality: Evidence from the field

  2013cited by this paper
• Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment

  2012cited by this paper
• 《The influence of institutional investors on myopic R＆D investment behavior》述评

  2012cited by this paper
• A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure

  2011cited by this paper
• Investment under Uncertainty, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Agency Conflicts

  2010cited by this paper
• Large risks, limited liability, and dynamic moral hazard

  2010cited by this paper
• Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

  2009cited by this paper
• Persistent Private Information

  2008cited by this paper
• Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications

  2007cited by this paper
• Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents

  2006cited by this paper
• Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model

  2006cited by this paper
• Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions

  2006cited by this paper
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent

  2005cited by this paper
• Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics

  2003cited by this paper
• Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices

  2000cited by this paper
• Rational Expectations and Rational Learning

  1993cited by this paper
• On Efficient Distribution With Private Information

  1992cited by this paper
• Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima

  1991cited by this paper
• Martingale and duality methods for utility maximization in a incomplete market

  1991cited by this paper
• Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior

  1989cited by this paper
• AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES

  1987cited by this paper
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting

  1987cited by this paper
• THE FIRST-ORDER APPROACH TO PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS

  1985cited by this paper

• Fixed-price or performance-based? Contract design with renegotiation for IT outsourcing

  2026cites this paper
• Incentives and constraints: An optimization mechanism for improving the performance of farmland protection entities

  2025cites this paper
• Optimal Incentive Mechanism: Balancing the Complex Risk Preferences of Shared Battery Swapping Station Enterprises Under Dual Asymmetric Information

  2025cites this paper
• Welfare Analysis with Uncertain Market Segment Proportions

  2024cites this paper
• Blockholder exit threats and excess executive perks

  2024cites this paper
• Enhancing synergistic performance through implicit incentive contracts: Addressing the “talent dilemma” in the public sector

  2024cites this paper
• Decision-making process towards real estate agents, landlords, and expatriate tenants’ criteria with perspective from principal-agent theory

  2023cites this paper