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Rebel Group Substitutes and Peace Agreement Amnesties

Matthew Hauenstein

Published 2023 in Journal of Politics

ABSTRACT

Why do governments grant amnesties to former rebels after civil wars? Scholars argue that governments use amnesties during negotiations to signal commitment to peace or prevent spoiling by rebel leaders. However, other reforms are stronger signals of commitment than amnesties, and rebel leaders are almost never prosecuted following comprehensive peace agreements, with or without amnesty. Thus, amnesties do not prevent leaders from undermining the peace. Instead, I argue that amnesties protect rank and file rebels from postwar prosecution. When there are multiple competing rebel groups, rebel foot soldiers can use the threat of exit to force their leaders to negotiate amnesties and ensure they are implemented. Using data on peace agreement provisions and implementation, coupled with a new measure of similar rebel groups, I show that governments are more likely to grant amnesties when faced with multiple similar rebel groups. Finally, I find that implementing amnesties prevents war recurrence when there are substitute groups but does nothing without them.

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