Comparing Power Indices

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2013

• Venue

  IGTR

• Publication date

  2013-06-09

• Fields of study

  Physics, Computer Science, Engineering, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1142/S0219198913400045
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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