Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in An Estimated Four-Agent New Keynesian Model

We examine the social and agent‐specific welfare effects of monetary and macroprudential policy in a four‐agent estimated macro‐economic model comprising “banked simple households,” “underbanked simple households,” “firm owners,” and “bank owners.” Optimal capital requirement and loan loss provisions ratios improve all agent‐specific and social welfare, but imply smaller gains for simple households and firm owners that rely on credit. Countercyclical capital buffers support firm owners and bank owners with smaller gains for the two simple households, while countercyclical loan loss provisions improve social welfare only for specific shocks. Coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies yields higher social welfare than no coordination.

• Publication year

  2023

• Venue

  Social Science Research Network

• Publication date

  2023-08-21

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2139/ssrn.4492721
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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