Abstract It is often argued that governments take advantage of extreme events to expand their power to the detriment of the political opposition and citizens at large. Violations of constitutional constraints are a clear indication of such opportunistic behaviour. We study whether natural disasters, conflicts and other extreme events systematically diminish governments' compliance with constitutional constraints. Our results indicate that governments are most likely to overstep their competences or disregard their responsibilities during civil conflicts, at the onset of international sanctions or following successful coups d’état. Interestingly, Cold War interventions by the United States that installed or supported a political leader led to a decrease in constitutional compliance in the target country, whereas Soviet interventions had no such effect. In contrast, banking crises and natural disasters, which threaten societies at large, but not necessarily the political elite, do not cause a significant decline in constitutional compliance.
Shocking resilience? Effects of extreme events on constitutional compliance
Abishek Choutagunta,Jerg Gutmann,Stefan Voigt
Published 2023 in Journal of Institutional Economics
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2023
- Venue
Journal of Institutional Economics
- Publication date
2023-09-14
- Fields of study
Not labeled
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-59 of 59 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
Showing 1-5 of 5 citing papers · Page 1 of 1