Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2023

• Venue

  Economic Modelling

• Publication date

  2023-09-01

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106536
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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