The existing philosophical views on what is the meaning of causality adequate to medicine are vastly divided. We approach this question and offer two arguments in favor of pluralism regarding concepts of causality. First, we analyze the three main types of research designs (randomized-controlled trials, observational epidemiology and laboratory research). We argue, using examples, that they allow for making causal conclusions that are best understood differently in each case (in agreement with a version of manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic definitions, respectively). Second, we analyze clinical practice and argue that these manipulationist, probabilistic and mechanistic causal claims can be used as evidence for different therapeutic decisions. We differentiate among ‘predicting’ that does not change the relata of causal claims, (mechanistic) ‘interferences’, and ‘interventions’ in the strict sense that act on causes to change effects. The central conclusion is that causal claims agreeing with diverse concepts of causality can deliver evidence for different types of therapeutic decisions.
Causal Pluralism in Medicine and its Implications for Clinical Practice
Published 2023 in Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2023
- Venue
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie
- Publication date
2023-11-03
- Fields of study
Medicine, Philosophy
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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