Polarization as Pluralistic Ignorance

Kenjiro Asami,Daiki Kishishita

Published 2025 in Journal of Public Economic Theory

ABSTRACT

Polarization is considered one of the most serious challenges in democratic countries. While substantial evidence points to exaggerated perceptions of polarization—called false polarization—whether it can persist in the long run remains understudied. This paper develops a social learning model in which each citizen belongs to either of two political groups and holds either of two attitudes on a controversial issue. In each period, two citizens—one from each group—publicly express their opinions on the issue. Citizens havePolitical polarization is considered one of the conformity motives, but their distribution could be misperceived. We show that false polarization may arise as pluralistic ignorance even when the majority shares the same attitude across the two groups. Specifically, when citizens underestimate others' conformity motives, perceived polarization can trigger a self‐reinforcing spiral, leading both groups to appear polarized. Consequently, both groups may continue to publicly express different opinions. Finally, we discuss conditions under which the formation of echo chambers either mitigates or exacerbates false polarization.

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