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Coups: Different Mechanisms and Their Consequences for Institution Change

B. Bueno de Mesquita,Alastair Smith

Published 2025 in Journal of Conflict Resolution

ABSTRACT

Based on an extension of selectorate theory, we characterize three structural conditions that make a coup likely: winning coalition size near the size that yields minimum utility to its members (so small or intermediate-sized coalitions), low economic productivity, and a leader relatively new to office. Policy misallocation exacerbates the risk of a coup. The theory and evidence show two mechanisms that increase the risk of coup: policy under-provision and over-provision. Leaders whose policy provisions are commensurate with expectations experience fewer coups. One anticipatory response of leaders to a heightened coup risk is to change the government’s institutions. High coup risks increase the likelihood of institution change whether a coup actually occurs or not. The threat of an under-provision coup tends to result in an expansion of the winning coalition size (democratization), while an elevated risk of an over-provision coup typically results in a contraction in coalition size whether a coup actually occurs or not.

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