Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups: How Does Coup Failure Affect Counterbalancing in Autocratic Regimes?

How do dictators successfully counterbalance (fragment their coercive apparatus) despite the significant risk of military retaliation? Drawing on recent insights that the timing of coup-proofing is essential to its success, I argue that dictators are more likely to increase counterbalancing efforts in the aftermath of failed coups. I test this proposition in a difference-in-differences framework, using novel data on coups and counterbalancing, and find a statistically significant effect of coup failure. I substantiate my analysis with two illustrative examples from Sierra Leone and Turkey that probe the plausibility of my theorized mechanism. My findings contribute to the growing literature on the effects of failed coups by opening up the discussion on their long-term structural consequences for the dictator’s security apparatus.

• Publication year

  2025

• Venue

  Journal of Conflict Resolution

• Publication date

  2025-11-11

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1177/00220027251395066
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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