The evolution of consciousness is a neglected topic that plays a surprisingly insignificant role in all major theories of consciousness. Furthermore, substantial disagreements can be observed in the dominant views on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), which focus too much on cortical brain regions. In order to dissolve some of the contradictions among these views and to constrain the rival theories, we propose to distinguish three core phenomena of phenomenal consciousness: basic arousal, general alertness and reflexive (self-)consciousness. The central aim is to show that we can fruitfully distinguish specific functions for each of the three phenomena. Basic arousal has the function to alarm the body and secure survival by intervening in the slow updating of homeostatic processes. General alertness fosters advanced learning and decision-making processes, enabling various new behavioural strategies to deal with challenges, and reflexive (self-)consciousness enables future-directed long-term planning, accounting for the mindset of oneself and other agents. Constraining our contemporary theories of consciousness with this evolutionary and functional approach will enable the science of consciousness to make progress by accounting for three specific functions of consciousness, thereby informing the search for distinct an NCC. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary functions of consciousness’.
Three types of phenomenal consciousness and their functional roles: unfolding the ALARM theory of consciousness
Albert Newen,Carlos Montemayor
Published 2025 in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
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- Publication year
2025
- Venue
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
- Publication date
2025-11-13
- Fields of study
Medicine, Philosophy
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar, PubMed
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