Hierarchies of Beliefs and Measurable Uniformizations

We extend the Fundamental Theorem of Epistemic Game Theory to games with Baire class one payoffs and locally compact Polish strategy spaces, and under Projective Determinacy, to games with analytically measurable payoffs and arbitrary Polish strategy spaces. We show that in full generality, the statement that rationalizable strategies are consistent with rationality and common belief in rationality follows from the Axiom of Real Determinacy, has a characterization in terms of real Gale-Stewart games, fails under the Continuum Hypothesis, and in the framework of interactive epistemics is equivalent to the Measurable Uniformization Principle from the Solovay model.

• Publication year

  2025

• Venue

  Unknown venue

• Publication date

  2025-12-01

• Fields of study

  Mathematics

• Identifiers
  arXiv 2512.01862
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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