Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.
No Reliable Evidence of Self-Reported Sentience in Small Large Language Models
Published 2026 in arXiv.org
ABSTRACT
PUBLICATION RECORD
- Publication year
2026
- Venue
arXiv.org
- Publication date
2026-01-20
- Fields of study
Computer Science
- Identifiers
- External record
- Source metadata
Semantic Scholar
CITATION MAP
EXTRACTION MAP
CLAIMS
- No claims are published for this paper.
CONCEPTS
- No concepts are published for this paper.
REFERENCES
Showing 1-33 of 33 references · Page 1 of 1
CITED BY
- No citing papers are available for this paper.
Showing 0-0 of 0 citing papers · Page 1 of 1