Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining

This paper analyzes the welfare impact of expanding the negotiation agenda of an international agreement between asymmetric countries (e.g., including specific negotiations over environmental regulations or labor standards in a conventional trade agreement) and demonstrates why such proposed expansions are contentious. A main result is that agenda expansions that provide more bargaining flexibility will increase the efficiency of the agreement but can result in a less equitable agreement that hurts the country that is at a bargaining disadvantage. Similarly, we demonstrate that decreases in bargaining game asymmetry can also make the disadvantaged country worse‐off even as it increases global welfare.

• Publication year

  2024

• Venue

  Economic Inquiry

• Publication date

  2024-01-01

• Fields of study

  Not labeled

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1111/ecin.13201
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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