The evolution of cooperation in the division of labor on generalized networks with a single output.

A general division of labor has an arbitrary number of subtasks, and asymmetric interactions among players in the subtask-holder upstream groups and the downstream groups. Cooperation among the subtask-holders is essential in division of labor. We construct a general division of labor network model with a single output, where subtask-holder groups are located, and the process never stops for a defection. We consider that cooperators and defectors exist in each subtask-holder group initially; cooperators in a group pay a cost of cooperation to upgrade the product or service quality, defectors do not pay any cost, reducing the quality. More cooperator groups can upgrade the quality more, thus all the players in all groups can obtain a better reputation defined as a bonus. We found that the division of labor with a bonus meets the social dilemma condition, and our model can be studied from the viewpoint of evolution of cooperation. Our analysis of replicator equations shows the benefits are canceled out in the equations; thus, benefits never influence the evolution of cooperation. As a result, the network structure of the division of labor never influences the dynamics. We also show that sanction on the defectors induces the evolution of cooperation and co-existences of cooperator groups and defector groups, and that the bonus functions determine whether the number of the subtask-holder groups in the division of labor influences on the evolution of cooperation. Our results will contribute to the theoretical understanding of division of labor on the network structure.

• Publication year

  2026

• Venue

  Journal of Theoretical Biology

• Publication date

  2026-02-01

• Fields of study

  Medicine, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2026.112408PMID 41765201
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

• The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional division of labour on a tree network

  2023cited by this paper
• The evolution of cooperation in the unidirectional linear division of labour of finite roles

  2022cited by this paper
• Propagation of Overseas Economic Shocks through Global Supply Chains: Firm-level Evidence

  2022cited by this paper
• Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions

  2021cited by this paper
• Firm-level propagation of shocks through supply-chain networks

  2019cited by this paper
• Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies

  2019cited by this paper
• The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor.

  2018cited by this paper
• Applications of agent-based modelling and simulation in the agri-food supply chains

  2017cited by this paper
• Asymmetric Evolutionary Games

  2015cited by this paper
• Human cooperation.

  2013cited by this paper
• Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent

  2012cited by this paper
• Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

  2010cited by this paper
• Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation.

  2010cited by this paper
• Division of Labor, Economic Specialization, and the Evolution of Social Stratification

  2008cited by this paper
• Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

  2006cited by this paper
• Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection.

  2006cited by this paper
• Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games

  2006cited by this paper
• A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks

  2006cited by this paper
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher.

  2006cited by this paper
• Wireless valley, silicon wadi and digital island--Helsinki, Tel Aviv and Dublin and the ICT global production network

  2005cited by this paper
• Evolution of rumours that discriminate lying defectors

  2004cited by this paper
• How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity.

  2004cited by this paper
• The evolution of altruistic punishment

  2003cited by this paper
• Global production networks and the analysis of economic development

  2002cited by this paper
• Supply chain modeling: past, present and future

  2002cited by this paper
• Reward and punishment

  2001cited by this paper
• Issues in Supply Chain Management

  2000cited by this paper
• Supply chain design and analysis:: Models and methods

  1998cited by this paper
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring

  1998cited by this paper
• The evolution of cooperation in a lattice-structured population.

  1997cited by this paper
• A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

  1993cited by this paper
• Evolutionary games and spatial chaos

  1992cited by this paper
• The Division of Labor, Local Markets, and Worker Organization

  1988cited by this paper
• An Evolutionary Approach to Norms

  1986cited by this paper
• The evolution of cooperation

  1981cited by this paper
• The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I.

  1964cited by this paper

• No citing papers are available for this paper.