The overcharge as a measure for antitrust damages

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2009

• Venue

  Dalton Transactions

• Publication date

  2009-08-12

• Fields of study

  Law, Business, Chemistry

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.2139/SSRN.1387096
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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