Clarity or collaboration: Balancing competing aims in bureaucratic design

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2018

• Venue

  Journal of Theoretical Politics

• Publication date

  2018-01-01

• Fields of study

  Business, Political Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1177/0951629817737859
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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