A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2009

• Venue

  Environment and Development Economics

• Publication date

  2009-10-01

• Fields of study

  Economics, Environmental Science

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1017/S1355770X09005178
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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