How much discretion for risk regulators

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2012

• Venue

  The RAND Journal of Economics

• Publication date

  2012-06-01

• Fields of study

  Law, Business, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1111/J.1756-2171.2012.00166.X
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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