Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
Atila Abdulkadroǧlu,Joshua D Angrist,Yusuke Narita,Parag A. Pathak,R. Zárate
Published 2017 in The American Economic Review
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- Publication year
2017
- Venue
The American Economic Review
- Publication date
2017-05-01
- Fields of study
Economics, Education
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