Economic principles in communication: an experimental study.

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2014

• Venue

  Journal of Theoretical Biology

• Publication date

  2014-12-21

• Fields of study

  Mathematics, Medicine, Economics

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.035PMID 25128236
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar, PubMed

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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