Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time-Consistent?

No abstract is available for this paper.

• Publication year

  2016

• Venue

  Cognitive Sciences

• Publication date

  2016-04-01

• Fields of study

  Medicine, Computer Science, Psychology

• Identifiers
  DOI 10.1111/cogs.12259PMID 26100936
• External record

  Open on Semantic Scholar

• Source metadata

  Semantic Scholar, PubMed

• No claims are published for this paper.

• No concepts are published for this paper.

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