Understanding Human Action

C. Schmidt

Published 1975 in Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing

ABSTRACT

Wittgenstein has said, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (1958). The point of this rather cryptic comment is undoubtedly Wittgenstein's contention that language or "language games" are embedded in what he termed "forms of life." That is, we are able to understand each other not just because we share common knowledge about the syntactic and semantic conventions for the use of words, but also because we share common knowledge about the forms of life or social reality within which we live and act. Wittgenstein's remarkable lion would presumably not share our social reality nor we have knowledge of the lion's social reality. Consequently, Wittgenstein would contend that this lion's exhibition of speech would not result in our being able to communicate with him nor he with us.

PUBLICATION RECORD

  • Publication year

    1975

  • Venue

    Theoretical Issues In Natural Language Processing

  • Publication date

    1975-06-10

  • Fields of study

    Philosophy, Computer Science, Psychology

  • Identifiers
  • External record

    Open on Semantic Scholar

  • Source metadata

    Semantic Scholar

CITATION MAP

EXTRACTION MAP

CLAIMS

  • No claims are published for this paper.

CONCEPTS

  • No concepts are published for this paper.

REFERENCES

CITED BY

Showing 1-36 of 36 citing papers · Page 1 of 1