We develop a two-country DSGE model with global banks to analyze the role of cross-border banking flows on the transmission of a quality of capital shock in the United States to emerging market economies (EMEs). Banks face a moral hazard problem for borrowing from households. EME's banks might be risky: they can also be constrained to borrow from U.S. banks. A negative quality of capital shock in the United States generates a global financial crisis. EME's macroprudential policy that targets non-core liabilities makes the domestic economy resilient to the volatility of cross-border banking flows and makes EME's households better-off.
Risky banks and macro-prudential policy for emerging economies
Published 2016 in Review of economic dynamics (Print)
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- Publication year
2016
- Venue
Review of economic dynamics (Print)
- Publication date
2016-06-01
- Fields of study
Business, Economics
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Semantic Scholar
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